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ARISTOTLE AND MODERN 
HISTORICAL CRITICISM 
J.M.P. LOWRY 
Aristotle is not generally revered as an historian of philosophy by modern 
historians of philosophy. Such historians tend to make a definite distinction between 
philosophy and the history of philosophy - a distinction which they do not find in 
Aristotle - and which they criticize him for not making. As Aristotle is a major 
source for the history of the Greek philosophical speculation which preceded him -
especially that of the Pres ocra tics - the question of how far his reporting and 
understanding of his predecessors is valid is of no mean importance for our own 
historie al and philosophical understanding. But th en the pursuit of such a question is 
already the begging of the question because the validity of Aristotle's procedures and 
views is only of importance for us in so far as what he sa ys can be said to transcend 
the purely historical confines of his time. But again such a transcendence assumes a 
distinction between the history of philosophy and philosophy. Yet Aristotle does not 
make su ch a distinction. Is this a failure or part of the very nature of philosophical 
truth? It is in an effort to answer this question that 1 shall in the following attempt to 
argue for Aristotle against some of his recent historical cri tics. 
II 
The most extensive and thoroughgoing work on the nature of Aristotle's 
references to and critiques of his predecessors has been that of Harold Cherniss. 
Cherniss' views are chiefly contained in two works: one entitled Aristotle's Criticism 
of Presocratic Philosophy,l and the other Aristotle's Criticism of Plata and the 
Academy.2I will de al with his first book and then with some views on its contents by 
Werner Jaeger and W.K.C. Guthrie, both of whom have carefully considered 
Aristotle's relation to his predecessors. 
1. Harold CHERNISS, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 
1935. 




Cherniss, in his work on Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, is 
generally critical of Aristotle as an historian. He accuses Aristotle of a multitude of 
sins, the underlying basis of which is an almost congenital lack of so-called 
"objectivity". In fact, Cherniss' whole attempt centres on the idea of objectivity as 
being a kind of Xerox print in which the pristine words of the Presocratics are 
preserved exactly as they were uttered, with even the exact motivation of their 
authors intact. Fundamental in ail of Aristotle's crimes is his attitude that ail his 
predecessors are lisping Aristotelians. According to Cherniss this was impossible 
because Aristotle's predecessors did not have Aristote1ian concepts (e.g., fourfold 
causality) in mind. Literally, they came before such concepts were conceived. Says 
Cherniss: "It can be shown that Aristotle was so consumed with the ideology of 
Platonism and the new concepts he had himself discovered or developed that it was 
impossible for him to imagine a time when thinking men did not see the problems of 
philosophy in the same terms as did he." 3 The two general classes of the Aristotelian 
sins based on anachronism are verbal misinterpretations and conflicting testimonies 
on a single point which lead to self-contradictions, clear misinterpretations, and 
omissions of particular doctrines of a philosopher which might impinge on an 
Aristotelian interpretation. Cherniss fills his book with references and data to back 
up his assertions, but perhaps one example will suffice. It is an example of a willful 
misinterpretation for the particular purpose of Aristotle's own argument: 
In De Generatione 333b 20-22 Aristotle insists that the elements were prior to the 
Sphere because he wants to show that "Love" is really a segregating force. In De 
Generatione 315a 19-21, however, where he seeks to show that Empedocles 
admitted the generation of the elements from a common material and so should 
have allowed them to arise from one another, he argues that the Sphere was an 
homogeneous material and complains that Empedocles does not allow one to 
decide wh ether the Sphere or the elements were prior, inasmuch as the e1ements 
arise from "alteration" of the Sphere and the Sphere from combination of the 
e1ements. In Metaphysics 1091b 4-12, nevertheless, desiring to find authority 
against Speusippus concerning the priority of the final cause, Aristotle argues 
that "Love", which he identifies with the Good, was the "generating" cause, 
which implies that the organic world is due to the force of "Love" alone.4 
Werner Jaeger wrote a review l of Cherniss' book in 1937 (two years after its 
publication) in which he criticizes Cherniss on a number of points, while agreeing 
with the basic contention that the philosophy of the Presocratics is only under-
standable "historically" when pruned of Aristotelian interpretation. What Jaeger 
chiefly laments is not so much Cherniss' failure to be fair to Aristotle as his failure to 
recognize the work of earlier scholars. According to J aeger nineteenth century 
scholarship based its research on the idea that Aristotle had only limited worth with 
3. Harold CHERNISS, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, Baltimore, 1935, p. x. 
4. Ibid., p. 196, note 211. 
5. Werner JAEGER, Rczension, "Cherniss: Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy," in Aristotles 
in der Neueren Forschung, hrsg. von Paul Moraux, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968, from the 
American Journal of Philosophy, LXIII, 1937, pp. 350-356. 
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respect to the Presocratics - one result being Karl Reinhardt's Parmenides (Bonn 
1916) which attempts ta overthrow the Aristotelian view of Parmenides - a result 
which Cherniss does not apparently even relegate ta a footnote! Jaeger then goes on 
to discuss Aristotle's relation to the Presocratics on the basis of his own form 
criticism of the Aristotelian corpus. He makes three major points. The first is that 
Metaphysics A belongs to the oldest part of the work and, since it is written under the 
influence of the Platonic Academy, the critic must realize that there are two main 
ideas discernible which have their roots in Plato and which Aristotle took over for 
himself. Firstly, there is a consciousness that the Platonic philosophy is the one true 
one; and, secondly, there is a tendency in the later dialogues for Plato ta comprehend 
or encompass the earlier philosophies. Jaeger's second point is that Aristotle 
undertook many historical endeavours (e.g., the chronical of musical and gymnastic 
games, and the work on the constitutions), and that his school produced pupils 
notable in such work (e.g., Theophrastus: History of Philosophy in 18 books; 
Eudemus: History of Geometry and Astronomy, and History of Theology; and 
Menon: History of Medicine). Thus, to say that Aristotle has no historical sense is, in 
Jaeger's view, too extreme. Jaeger's third point against Cherniss is that the work of 
Aristotle's pupils is indispensable to an understanding of Aristotle's own views 
because he passed on his most matured views to his school in later life when he was 
no longer under Academie influence. The development of his views would, for 
example, account for finding different Aristotelian interpretations of the same point. 
Nevertheless, Jaeger's differences with Cherniss tend to be more one of degree than 
of kind. 
The same sort of difference can be in general attributed to W.K.C. Guthrie's 
discussion of Cherniss' views. 6 Guthrie thinks that Aristotle was not too bad an 
historian because he often points out when he is interpreting a philosopher's view. 
One example that Guthrie gives is Metaphysics A 983 b 21 where Aristotle dis tin-
guishes c1early between Thales' reason for his statement, and the statement of Thales 
itself. Guthrie also notes that Aristotle at least occasionally slips. For example, in 
regard to the eighth fragment of Empedocles Aristotle, according ta Guthrie, gives 
two senses tO'PVO'LÇ: one in De Generatione 314 b 5 (substratum), and another in 
Metaphysics 6. 1014 b 35 (by nature). Guthrie wishes to take a kind of middle stand 
on the question of Aristotle's worth as an historian, but it is a view that is not 
essentially different from that of either Cherniss or J aeger : " ... if we use the evidence 
which he [Aristotle] is a good enough historian to give us, we may succeed in 
overcoming both our own preconceptions and his and getting nearer the mind of a 
pre-Platonic thinker ... As an historian Aristotle has serious failings, but he deserves 
less wholesale condemnation than he is at the moment in danger of receiving." 7 
6. W.K.C. GnHRIE, "Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy: Sorne Prelirninaries," Journal o(Hellenic 
Studies, LXXVII (ParI 1), 1957, pp. 35-41. 




For Cherniss, Jaeger, and Guthrie Aristotle is a kind of half-way house. For 
them Aristotle began to develop various tools of thought - logical instruments 
which could secure darity of thinking and help men to free themselves in empirical 
endeavours from the illusory delusion of appearances. Unfortunately, Aristotle 
himself did not, according to such an account, keep from falling into the trap of 
delusion, but, not having proceeded far enough along the straight and narrow pa th of 
finite logic, tried to bring the divided finite iuta a metaphysical unit y , which, had he 
developed farther logically, he would have realized was impossible. In other words 
the Pres ocra tics represent philosophical perspectives that are not fully taken up into 
Aristotle's metaphysics and hence invalidate any daim that it is, as Aristotle himself 
daims, a complete systematic totality. What we are left with is not an Aristotelian 
synthesis that transcends time and place, but a purely historical relation to Aristotle's 
metaphysical overview. This historical relation is, at the same time, an eclectic 
relation to that part of Aristotle's philosophy which seems to be able to be a basis for 
further development; namely, his initial efforts in elucidating logical princip les and 
laws g and in attending to the different meanings of basic philosophical terms both in 
themselves and in relation to ordinary language. 9 The root of such an historical and 
edectic relation to Aristotle's philosophy is the assumption that the history of 
philosophy and philosophy are separable. It is precisely concerning this assumption 
that Aristotle éould, 1 think, fÏnd a ground for defense. The notion of the kind of 
answer in which he would reply to his historical cri tics wou Id need to entail an 
explanation of how their notion of the history of their subject assumes an improper 
and inadequate understanding of its content. For Aristotle there can be, properly 
speaking, no history of philosophy. Neither Cherniss, Jaeger, nor Guthrie could 
accept such a view because they ail conceive of Aristotle as having a definite position 
in relation to such an history. But from Aristotle's standpoint it would be a great 
error to give him the position which such modern historians of philosophy would like 
to bestow. Such a bestowal by a modern historian of philosophy only belies, from 
Aristotle's point of view, that his philosophy is so misunderstood by the modern 
historian that he is entirely innocent of its structure and content. He literally does not 
know on what it is that he is bestowing a judgement. 
For Aristotle would not allow that his philosophy bears an historical relation to 
those of his predecessors and, as we shall see, successors in any modern sense. First of 
ail Aristotle does not write histories in the sense of narrative of any subject. He writes 
prefaces to his various treatises. He writes histories in the sense of inquiry JO, but this 
is not the meaning behind any judgement of Aristotle's view of his philosophy vis-à-
vis those of his predecessors. What is an history? Aristotle dearly defines it in the 
Poetics Il as that which has as the content of its statements singulars which are 
8. For example: the law of non-contradiction (Mela., r , 3); the syllogism (Prioy Anal., J, 4, 
25 b 32-35); the concept of analogy (Mela., A 4 and 5). 
9. For example see the various dcfinitions of philosophical tcrms in Mera.,/i.. 
10. For example: TilN nEPI TA ZilIA I~TOPIAN (Concerning the History of Animais). 
Il. Poetics, 1451 b 6. 
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indifferent in their connections. Poetry deals with universal statements and therefore 
with necessity or possible necessity. The best poetry, be it narrative or dramatic, is for 
Aristotle like a living being (t0ov). Aristotle makes this view evident when he 
advocates that the construction of stories told or portrayed poetically should be 
"about one action, a complete whole, having a beginning, mlddle, and end, in order 
that it, just as a living being (t0ov) which is one whole, might produce its own 
appropria te pleasure." 12 Because poetry deals with universals and because it does so 
in an organically and therefore wholly unified way, it is for Aristotle more 
philosophical than history. The trouble with history is that it does not in itself have 
such a unity. As an inquiry which deals with past singulars history has the defect of 
getting caught up in phenomena by taking them as the definite, as the measure of 
truth; but what history takes as true is no more than the indefinite infinitude of 
empirical experience and its attendant Q,nop[(u. Even the style of history belies its 
indeterminate content. It is, says Aristotle, commenting on Herodotus in the 
Rhetorica, a style of inquiring in which there is no internai endY It is not like the 
compact style of the ancient poets who used antistrophes. The indefinite style of 
history and its endless content of particularity cannot be for Aristotle a medium 
capable of philosophic content. For him philosophy is a theoretical inquiry.14 
It has neither the indeterminate finitude of the practical, nor the ambiguous 
becoming of the productive for its content. There are three theoretical inquiries: 
mathematics, physics, and theology.15 The first is insubstantial, the second 
deals with sensible substance as peris hable and imperishable, and the third deals with 
immovable substance. 16 Philosophy is as first and second theology and physics. It has 
for its object substance and for its goal truth. It is, in Aristotle's words, the "science 
of truth' 17 ( àWrr/Il'T/ rfie; àÀ'T/Oé.ae;) , and as su ch the science whose content is 
knowledge. So high is its demand that a philosopher must honour truth above his 
own friends. 18 This is because he is neither a sophist nor a dialectician. The former 
deals in sophistic or the apparent, the latter with dialectic or opinion 19 as the endless 
process of division. "The dialectic," sa ys Aristotle, "is able to divide into pieces that 
which philosophy makes known, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but 
is not." 20 The philosopher deals with the changing and with the unchanging. He is 
both physicist and theologian. And he makes known because he knows the triadic 
substantial objects of his science. 
Such knowledge is not historical knowledge, because knowledge qua knowledge 
does not take mere historical form. Its form as philosophic indudes historic content 
but not as historic. To understand Aristotle's daims for his philosophical science it is 
12. Ibid.. 1459 a 20. Ail translations of passages from Aristotle are my own. 
13. Rhetorica, 1409 a 23. 
14. Nicomachean Ethics. book VI. esp. 1141 a 34-1141 b 8; and Mela., 982 b 28-983 a Il. 
15. Meta .. 1064 a 28ff. 
16. Ibid.. 1069 a 30ff. 
17. Ibid.. 993 b 19-20. 
1 R. ll/icomachean Ethics, 1096 b 15. 
19. Tapica. 105 b 30. 
20. Meta .• 1004 b 25-26. 
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necessary to consider the order in which seeming historic content appears in the 
Metaphysics. Aristotle does not begin with Thales. He begins with the phenome-
nology of knowledge as knowledge of cause. This knowledge as content is the 
Wisdom (oO<p{a) of the Nicomachean Ethics 21 wherein Aristotle argues that it is 
nothing less than the combination of ÉrrWTTJ/J.'T/ and vov<:, of scientific knowledge 
wherein ato8i}ot<: is the starting-point and of intuitive reason wherein the ground of 
that starting-point is grasped as undogmatic. Wisdom is the knowledge wherein the 
Wise Man knows that Physics and Theology are ultimately one. This is why Aristotle 
goes on to argue that "the firsts and the causes are most knowable ; for through these 
and out of these everything e1se is known, but not these through the subordinate 
things." 22 Yet men delight in their senses.B The wonder caused thereby is the 
beginning of knowledge. 24 The beginning of knowledge is knowledge of first 
principles. Aristotle makes both statements because the Wise Man is both physicist 
and theologian. 
It is only after a consideration of the nature of knowledge and the characteristics 
of wisdom that Aristotle begins to discuss other philosophers; and this discussion 
takes place within a definite context: not the context of the endless disconnectedness 
of history, but the context of cause. The physicist knows four causes. Can there be 
more? Or are they, no more and no less, the pure content of physics? Let us see if 
anyone has any others. So Aristotle begins his account of cause as fourfold. 25 He does 
not even take up ail the Presocratics. He does not even here in Book A of the 
Metaphysics mention Anaximander. Why? Because the chrEtpov(non-limited) is more 
transparently material cause than any of the four. It is indefiniteness itself. It makes 
no other claim. Aristotle is not concerned with the indefinite ramblings of early 
inquiry. He is interested in its philosophical content. He is not a narrator of the free-
running historical style. He looks for the universal, for the unit y of beginning, 
middle, and end. And so, like Homer,26 he selects what is germane and grounds the 
indefinite in its principle. Aristotle moves through the causes in a particular order: 
material, efficient, formai, and final cause. 27 Matter as indefinite must move. As 
moved it is form. The first three are found by his predecessors, the la st by himself. 
The last is that which unites them, that for the sake of which they ail move. Aristotle 
ends Book A with the assertion that there are indeed only the four causes of the 
Physics: 
21. Nicomachean Ethics, book VI. 
22. Meta., 982 b 1-3. 
23. Ibid., 980 a 2. 
24. Ibid., 982 b 8. 
25. Ibid., 983 a 24ff. 
26. Poetics, 1451 a ff. 
27. At the beginning of Meta., A, chapter 3, Aristotle considers the four causes in the order of material, 
formaI, efficient, and final. This is because he is thinking of their logical relations as total oppositions 
which are self-contained. In the body of the argument the order is material, efficient, formaI, and 
final because he is considering how one moves from physics, from the finite world of nature, to 
theology or metaphysics. This is the historical as opposed to the phenomenological order. For the 
distinction of these two ter ms cf. below section IV. 
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That everyone seems to seek the causes spoken of in the Physics and that we have 
not been able to name any beyond these, is clear from what has laready been 
stated above. But these causes were dimly sought, and in one way ail have been 
spoken of before, and in another way ail have been spoken of not at ail. For the 
first philosophy seems to Iisp concerning everything, inasmuch as it, being the 
first, is both young and beginning. 28 
The opening statement,29 that men take delight in their senses, is vindicated. It is 
vindicated because it is the unconscious signpost (01)fJ.Efov) of man's inner nature 
(..pVOLÇ) which has yet to grow ('-PÛEW) into knowing (ra EtO€Vat). For, in knowing, 
man's nature is not in a state of growth but has grown. The desire for knowledge is 
satisfied. The senses awaken what is hidden and open the way for their own 
completion. They as divided are at first immediate. But as mediated by memory 
(J..tvT]fJ.1)), experience (ÉfJ.'TrELpia), art (rÉXV77), and reasoning (ÀQ'YWfJ.Oç) they are taken 
up into their source or cause. Their end or rÉÀo, is knowledge - but not knowledge 
as object but as the content of a knowing subject. Thus man's nature is not ÉmornfJ.1) 
(knowledge, science) as such, but ro EÎô(;/JaL (to know). The phenomenality of this 
knowing is fourfold. It has content in matter and form as undivided. But it also has 
movement in combining and separating and uniting - in reflection and judgement. 
Yet ail this is for an end. For knowing is the end ofinquiry. Knowledge is the inquiry 
as perfected. It is the inquiring as no longer discursively present. Rather it is having 
inquired - the inquiry as present in ail its moments at once. Thus the dividedness of 
the causes in the Physics is in Metaphysics seen to be also undivided. For metaphysics 
is first philosophy ('TrpW71) ..pLÀOOa.pia) or theology. And in its way, it, like sensation, is 
first. Book small a considers how voiJç is the prior knowledge of the necessity of a 
bound infinite, of the impossibility of an infinite regress - the dividedness of the 
causes as simple unit y - unit y as ended. For it is only the binding of the infinite 
which makes possible truth, the Good, practical activity, reason, science, and 
thinking. 30 Hence, in Aristotle's view, allow an infinite regress and there can be no 
world. For in eliminating causal activity the effects are also annihilated. The 
conceiving of this logical necessity is both the foundation of logic and of the world. It 
is as su ch the first step in recognizing that causes are finite in number. In a way they 
are one as we learn in Book A. They are voik as the ô 8faç which is also Life in the 
full est sense. 31 And in a way they are fourfold as the unfolding and enfolding of that 
divine activity. 
How does one criticize Aristotle? He did not write an history. He commented on 
the older philosophers in so far as they were physicists or theologians. He found them 
to be in general both, but without the concepts to make it possible for them to clearly 
distinguish between the two aspects of philosophy and to see at the same time their 
28. Mela., 993 a II-J7. 
29. Ibid., 980 a 1-2. 
30. Cf., ibid., 994 b 9-24. 
31. Mela., 1072 b 26-30. "And Life belongs (to God). For the actuality of Mind is Life, and that 
one (God) is actuality. And actuality, the actuality of that one (God) according to itself, is Life 
best and eternal. Thus we say that God is an Animal eternal and best, so that life and age 
continuous and eternal belong to God. For this is (the) God." 
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absolute simple congruity. Thus Book B begins the laborious task of explicating how 
the unit y of physical and theological knowledge, of the dogmatism of Books A and 
small a can be shown undogmatically and absolutely. So it is that in Book B Aristotle 
does not begin this task in any ordinary way, but by indicating in the c1earest 
language that the émopiaL (road blocks - a no-way-through) to the divine science, 
the theology of cause which enfolds physics as weil as metaphysics, are a totality 
which can be known as such. Thus he says in the opening lines: 
Firstly, it is necessary in relation to the science being sought that we first go 
through those things which block its path. And those are as many as anyone has 
left remaining, and any besides those which happen to have been overlooked. 
For it is profitable to those wishing a c1ear passage to go through (the blockages) 
weil. For the later c1ear passage is the loosing of the previous blockages. But not 
to loose (them) is the imprisonment of being ignorant. 32 
The problems that block the path of knowledge must al! be considered; not 
sorne of the problems, but ail. None must be allowed to be future. They must ail be 
present now. Thus he continues: 
But the blockage of thought is evidently that of the thing. For to the one to 
whom it is a blockage there is a resemblance to those who are imprisoned. For in 
both cases it is impossible to proceed into what lies ahead. Therefore it is 
necessary to have looked at aIl the difficulties beforehand, both for the sake of 
these things and because those seeking without first passing through (the 
blockage) are like those who walk being ignorant of where (they are going); and 
in such a situation one does not know whether or not he has found what is being 
sought. For the end is not c1ear to such a person, while to the one who has the 
blockages before it is c1ear. And further, it is necessarily better to have looked at 
aIl the difficulties with a view to judging (aIl the arguments) as if having heard ail 
the arguments of disputing plantiffs and defendants. 33 
Here in Book B as in Book A Aristotle is concerned ta have a completeness to 
his inquiry so that it cannot be in relation to philosophy in the same position as that 
of his predecessors. For Aristotle's standpoint is that if one philosophizes long 
enough and deeply enough he will inevitably come up with the same causes and the 
sa me problems - no more, no less. And they willlead to the same development and 
solution, and thereby conc1ude. And in conc1uding the ignorance of the earlier 
philosophers can be fairly and honourably transformed into Wisdom.Yet Aristotle's 
historically oriented critics insist that Aristotle wronged his predecessors by reading 
his own speculations into theirs' and by adjusting their ideas to fit his own. But in 
what ways can Aristotle be said to have done so? Did he fail to give an history of the 
speculations of his predecessors? He did so fail, but only in that as far as their 
philosophy was merely history it was ignorance. Did he misrepresent them ? If he did 
so it was only in the sense of a transformation within necessary limits; that is, the 
four causes. Any misrepresentation of another's thought wou Id, from an Aristotelian 
vantage point, occur only if it could be shown either that a predecessor had more 
causes than the four or that Aristotle had attributed to a predecessor one or more of 
32. Meta., 995 a 34-30. 
33. Ibid., 995 a 30-995 b 3. 
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the four causes wrongly according to his own system. Then is not Aristotle's system 
itself too confining? This is the crux of the issue. Aristotle would, 1 think, argue that 
the four causes are a tatality: that any discussion of phenomena must absolutely 
come under them because they are the ground, the life ofphenomena. It is impossible 
from an Aristotelian point of view to speak philosophically without speaking in sorne 
way of the causes. Aristotle's line of defense would, 1 think, have to ultimately be to 
put the on us squarely on his critics. For in order to prove that Aristotle is confining 
the arguments of his predecessors within a simply Aristotelian framework it would be 
necessary to demonstrate that the four causes are not a totality, are not the ground 
and life of phenomena. It would be necessary to show that someone cou Id actually 
speak phiIosophically without any of the four causes being somehow in the content of 
what i5 said. No doubt an Aristotelian critic might reject this defense on the ground 
that Aristotle's definition of philosophy is unacceptable. But such assertion on 
grounds of definition is not unattended by Aristotle if one consider only that he 
juxtaposes philosophy with sophistic and dialectic. )4 The critic will have to show 
that there is actually a science or inquiry which is neither sophistry nor 
dialectic (that is, which has as content neither simply indeterminate appearance nor 
indeterminate divided finitude) and which yet deals with the sa me subject matter as 
philosophy. Failure to actually come up with an alternative, rather than to posit mere 
possibility, will result in the critic being either a sophist or dialectician and so having 
no claim to wisdom. He will, unlike Aristotle, be unable ta say that he knows. What 
is then really at stake in an Aristotelian defense of the totality of fourfold causality is 
whether Aristotle's position is true or, finally, just Aristotelian. 
IV 
The basic assumption which is shared alike by modern historians of philosophy 
like Cherniss, Jaeger, and Guthrie is that there is an essential division between 
history of philosophy and philosophy itself. This assumption is in direct opposition 
to Aristotle's view: namely, that in so far as one can speak of an history of 
philosophy one must speak of it as no more, no less than philosophy itself. This is 
why Aristotle maintains that the subject matter of philosophy, namely truth 
(iÛ\1]8Eta), is also the principle of philosophic development. Thus Aristotle sa ys in 
Book A, chapter 3, of the Metaphysics, after having considered earlier views which 
confined cause to matter: 
But after these (men) and su ch first principles, as they were not sufficient to 
generate the nature of the beings, being compelled by the truth itself, just as we 
said, they sought for the next cause. J5 
Cherniss, Jaeger, and Guthrie c\early enough recognize that Aristotle considered his 
predecessors' views as only half-truths within a wider framework of complete truth. 
But they question whether Aristotle couId so consider his relation to the earher 
philosophers. From their historical point of view there can be no total complete 
34. Ibid.. 1004 b 25-26. Cf. ahove page 21. 
35. Ibid., 984 b 8-11. 
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view; there can only be views among which there is Aristotle's as weil as those of his 
predecessors and successors. If sorne views are more true than others it is bec au se 
they recognize the essential incomprehensibility of any would-be comprehension. 
Truth in this sense is really more the absence of truth. lt is a kind of dogmatism which 
can make room for any number of views, while at then sa me time it is a scepticism 
which cannot accept that any one view can be absolute. It follows quite naturally 
that, in the absence of any more th an relative truth, the objective is temporalized as 
occurrences or hislorical facls. Factual accuracy takes the place of judgement instead 
of being that which is judged. The temporalization of objectivity becomes only the 
collection of historical facts. 
From an Aristotelian perspective the notion that truth is only historical, because 
it is temporally relative, has an implicit difficulty; namely, that such an under-
standing is itself a position which is not outside of a metaphysical comprehension. 
Cherniss, Jaegar, and Guthrie cannot develop their views metaphysically because 
their position is implicitly that philosophy is simply history; or, in other words, that 
there is simply an history which is endless movement of time. Such a position does 
not recognize any definitive relation between historical moments and must finally be 
forced to consider them in themselves as indifferent to one another. How there can be 
a transition between them is not something that can be asked or answered within an 
historical non-teleological perspective. Philosophy must be for it always an immer-
sion into particular or momentary problems. Philosophy is thus caught in a web of 
temporality which is always oriented toward an open-ended future. The historian 
himself is oriented toward the past, but in such a way that, although he might prefer 
one past thinker or philosophy over another, he can never think to have arrived at a 
final position which future historical development could not disturb. 
Aristotle's position is quite different. It is grounded in his teaching that the very 
subject matter of philosophy necessitates a particular development; that the move-
ment of the concepts is their own and not the imposition of a merely external 
standpoint. The movement of philosophy is thus not only so many historically bound 
positions which may or may not be isolated, but an integrally woven pattern in which 
ail one-sided positions are included, but not on their own exclusive terms. Such a 
position has a different sort of objectivity than a so-called historical objectivity, but it 
is not an objectivity that neglects history; on the contrary, it cannot neglect either 
what was said by others or how it was said, because, in addition, it must not neglect 
what can be said. It is this transcendental perspective which distinguishes Aristotle's 
position from a purely historical one. History must, as temporal occurrence, be put 
into an eternal or logical perspective, if it is to be intelligible; otherwise it will be a 
temporality which has no rÉÀoc; and so no princip le of causation. One will not be able 
to speak of development but only of occurrence. This is why Aristotle's whole 
philosophical effort to ground the beings of physics, of temporality, in an eternal 
principle 36 is oriented toward the overcoming of such a finÏte open-ended historical 
standpoint. Rather than being bound by one historical position or another, he seeks 
to bind them. Failure to do so would lead philosophically either to an historical 
36. Cf.. Meta .• A. 7; esp. 1072 b 13-30. and De Anima. 415 b 7-26. 
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dogmatism which must arbitrarily prefer one position over another or to an historical 
scepticism which suspends judgement on any position, even its own. Aristotle's 
remarks about earlier philosophers and about his relation to Them only seem 
arbitrary and hubristic if it is forgotten that they are made with a view to overcoming 
the arbitrariness and hubris of a dogmatism and scepticism which, in not being able 
to limit their own contingency, absolutize themselvcs. 
Aristotle's view of historical philosophic development is grounded in the idea 
that phenomena are neither a falling away from their source nor an indifferent series. 
He does not see Them either as their own ends or as undeveloped, but as being various 
ends which have a common end and, therefore, a necessary relation which manifests 
itself finitely as a definite development. Aristotle views phenomena in just This way 
precisely because he sees phenomena as contingent and dependent. They are as 
temporal occurrences historical and finite. But They are also grounded in the finality 
of a divine being in which the unit y of the four causes converge. By enveloping the 
relation of the beings of temporal occurrence and the divine eternal being within the 
common framework of fourfold causality Aristotle can absorb an historical perspec-
tive within a transcendental one. He can do This because he can be systematic. From a 
sim ply historical perspective it does not seem as if system is possible, because it would 
entail seeing the finite as logically one with the infinite, or seeing the endless 
particularity of the historical as transcendent al. But for Aristotle such a relation of 
finite and infinite is possible because for him the Koap.o<:; is philosophically known as 
infinite and finite, as infinitely divided and infinitely one. It is both a living animal, a 
<pva(<:; , and a living mind, a /...fryo<:;. It is logical and alive. 37 
37. Cf., ibid., esp. 1072 b 13-30. 
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